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Abstract
This study argues that strong evidence contradicting the traditional assumption
of time-consistent preferences is not available. The study builds and analyzes
the implications of a deterministic general equilibrium model and compares
them to data from the U.S. asset market. The model implies that (1) because of
dynamic arbitrage, the prices of retradable assets cannot reveal whether pref-
erences are time-inconsistent; but (2) the prices of commitment assets, invest-
ments which must be held for their lifetime, can. These prices will be higher
than the present values of their future payoffs only when preferences are time-
inconsistent. And (3) when preferences are time-inconsistent, people will not
hold both retradable and commitment assets. Empirical observations on two ex-
amples of commitment assets—education and individual retirement accounts—
are not consistent with these model implications.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.Jan is about to go out to her neighborhood bar. Before
drinking anything there, Jan would like to sign a legally
binding contract stating that she is allowed to drink only
four beers that night. Why does she want to sign such a
contract? She knows that after having four beers, she will
want to have a ﬁfth, and she wants to prevent herself from
doing so.
Jan is exhibiting what economists call time-inconsistent
preferences: her preferences for beer, at a given date and
state, changeover time without the arrivalof new informa-
tion.Anessentialfeatureoftime-inconsistencyisthedesire
forself-commitment.PeoplelikeJanwithtime-inconsistent
preferences are willing to pay a cost to restrict their future
choices.
Until recently, economists have typically assumed that
the preferences of most people are consistent over time. In
thelastﬁveyears,however,researchintotheconsequences
oftime-inconsistencyhas increased.Muchofthishas been
spurred by the work of Laibson (1997) on consumption
and saving.
1 Laibson assumes that people would like to be
able to commit to save more at some future date than they
think they actually would otherwise save when they get to
that date. He then considers the consequences of these
kindsofpreferencesforstandardmacroeconomicphenom-
ena like the covariation of household consumption and in-
come and the level of household saving.
Laibsonarguesthataconsiderableamountofintrospec-
tiveandexperimentalevidencesupportshisformulationof
time-inconsistent preferences. However, switching from a
standard modeling strategy to one with time-inconsistent
preferences can dramatically change a model’s implica-
tions for economic policy.
2 So to make such a switch, we
need to have more than introspective and experimental
evidence that preferences are time-inconsistent; we need
supportive evidence from actual choices that affect actual
outcomes.
In this study, I ask, Can we see that sort of evidence in
asset market data? My answer is that we cannot see this
evidence in the prices of retradable assets. Rather, we need
to look at the prices and holdings of what I call commit-
ment assets.
I determine this by building and analyzing the implica-
tions of a deterministic, three-period general equilibrium
model. In this model economy, agents can, in the initial
period, trade a one-period (short-term) bond, a two-period
(long-term) bond, and a commitment asset which, as the
name implies, is an investment that must be held for its
lifetime. The long-term bond can be retraded in the second
period; the commitment asset cannot be. Also, agents can-
notborrowinthesecondperiodagainstthefutureproceeds
of the commitment asset.
3
When the agents in this model economy have time-
inconsistent preferences, they have three utility discount
factors. They have two in period 1, one to discount the
utility of consumption between periods 1 and 2 and one to
discount that utility between periods 2 and 3. And they
have another in period 2, also to discount utility between
periods 2 and 3. Preferences are time-inconsistent if and
only if the utility discount factor between periods 2 and 3
is different in period 2 than in period 1. I follow Laibson
by restricting attention to the case in which the value of
this discount factor in period 1 is greater than or equal to
its value in period 2; over time, that is, the discount factor
may decline.
In this model economy, I prove three results. First I ex-
amine the informational content of the prices of the short-
and long-term bonds. Intuition might suggest that these
prices are enough to tell us whether or not preferences are
time-inconsistent. Again, the economy has three bond
prices and three discount factors. Since we have three ob-
servable variables and three unknown parameters, it might
seem plausible that we should be able to ﬁgure out wheth-
er preferences are time-consistent or time-inconsistent.
As my ﬁrst result, I prove that this line of reasoning is
wrong: in any equilibrium, bond prices are consistent with
thediscountfactorbetweenperiods2and3beingthesame
in period 1 as in period 2. The mistake in the intuitive rea-
soning is that it ignores dynamic arbitrage. Regardless of
theformofpreferences,theperiod1relativepricebetween
the two bonds must equal the period 2 price of the long-
term bond; otherwise, agents can make arbitrage proﬁts.
The two bond prices are thus not independent sources of
information about the two discount factors. To try to learn
about time-inconsistent preferences, we must turn instead
to price data on the commitment asset.
My second result is that we can, indeed, tell from the
price of the commitment asset whether or not agents’ pref-
erences are time-inconsistent. In particular, I prove that the
price of the commitment asset is higher than the present
value of its future payoffs if and only if preferences are
time-inconsistent. In effect, time-inconsistent people value
commitment, and this value shows up in the price of the
commitment asset.
My ﬁnal result concerns agents’ holdings of the com-
mitment asset and the long-term bond. I prove that if pref-
erences are time-inconsistent, then all agents’ asset hold-
ings are exclusive: in period 3, agents receive all income
from either the commitment asset or the long-term bond;
they don’t receive income from both types of assets. If
some agents held both the commitment asset and the long-
term bond at the end of period 2, then, on the margin, the
commitment asset would provide no commitment. The
agents could always reduce their consumption in period 3
by lowering their holdings of the bond. Because in this
case, the commitment asset and the long-term bond would
be marginally equivalent, they would have the same price.
But this contradicts the second result. Therefore, in period
3, if preferences are time-inconsistent, the holdings of the
commitment asset and the long-term bond must be exclu-
sive.
How do these implications of time-inconsistent prefer-
ences compare to empirical observations from the U.S. as-
set market? To answer that question, I examine evidence
abouttwogoodexamplesofcommitmentassets:education
and individual retirement accounts (IRAs). Contrary to the
implications of time-inconsistent preferences, neither asset
seems to have an unusually low after-tax return. And vir-
tually all agents with education or IRAs also have highly
liquid bank accounts or highly collateralizable housing.
This contradicts the exclusive holdings result. I conclude
that there is little evidence from data on these two commit-
ment assets against the traditional assumption that prefer-
ences are time-consistent.
4A Model With Time-Inconsistent Preferences
I start by developing a general equilibrium model of asset
pricinginwhichpeoplehavetime-inconsistentpreferences.
The model has a unit measure of people, indexed by j
∈ [0,1], who all live for three periods.
5 The world is de-
terministic and has a single perishable consumption good.
Each agent is endowed with y1units of consumption in pe-
riod 1.
Agents are each also endowed with three assets. I refer
to the ﬁrst two assets as bonds. Each agent is endowed
with ¯ b2 units of a short-term bond that pays off one unit of
consumption in period 2; each agent is also endowed with
¯ b3 units of a long-term bond that pays off one unit of
consumption in period 3 but can be retraded in period 2.
The last asset is a commitment asset which cannot be re-
traded. It pays off one unit of consumption in period 3, and
each agent is endowed with ¯ b
c
3
om units of it. These three
assets are the entire endowment of the Jagents; hence, the
per capita endowment in periods 2 and 3 is given by y2 =




All agents have identical preferences over future con-
sumptionstreams.However,thesepreferencesmaychange




where the β’s here represent discount factors in period 1,
β12 between periods 1 and 2 and β23 between periods 2
and 3. The agents’ preferences over consumption streams
(c2,c3) in period 2 are representable by this utility func-
tion:
u(c2)+β′ 23u(c3)
for β′ 23 ≤β 23, where β′ 23 is the discount factor in period 2
between periods 2 and 3.
If β′ 23 = β23, then the agents’ preferences are time-
consistent; the discount factor between periods 2 and 3 is
the same in period 2 as in period 1. Otherwise, preferences
aretime-inconsistent.Tounderstandthisassertion,suppose
that β′ 23 < β23, and suppose that one individual—say,
Paul—is endowed with one unit of consumption in each
period. Paul is asked, would you be willing to give up ε
units of consumption in period 3 in exchange for ε/Runits
of consumption in period 2, given that β′ 23R <1<β23R?
In period 1, Paul would respond negatively to this ques-
tion; the rate of return R is higher than the discount rate
between periods 2 and 3, so he would not want a loan on
these terms in period 2. In period 2, though, he would
respond affirmatively. Just like Jan in the introduction,
Paul would like to sign a contract in period 1 preventing
himself from doing what he thinks he will otherwise do in
period 2, here, accept the period 2 loan.
The restriction that β′ 23 ≤β 23 guarantees that in period
1, agents want more period 2 saving than they do when
they actually get to period 2. If β12 = β23 = β′ 23, then
preferences are said to exhibit exponential discounting. I
assume that u′,− u″ > 0 and that u′(0) = ∞.
Agents engage in trade in both periods 1 and 2. In pe-
riod 1, after receiving their endowments, the agents can
trade the three assets and consumption. They cannot short
sell the assets (so that holdings are restricted to being non-
negative). In period 2, after receiving their payoffs from
their holdings of the short-term bond, the agents can trade
consumption and the long-term bond that pays off in pe-
riod 3. Again, they cannot short sell the traded asset or
trade the commitment asset in period 2. Thus, holding a
units of the commitment asset commits the agent to con-
suming no less than a units of consumption in period 3.
In both periods, consumption is the numeraire. I use the
following notation for prices: qst is the price in period s of
a bond that pays off in period t, and pcom is the period 1
price of the commitment asset.
Decision Problems
Given this trading protocol, I can now write agent j’s de-
cision problems in periods 2 and 1.
Period 2
Agent jenters period 2 with b
j
12 units of the bond that pays
off in period 2, b
j
13 units of the bond that pays off in period
3, and a
j
com units of the commitment asset. Then, given a
price q23, the agent has to choose b
j
23 units of period 3
bonds and c
j








































































13) taking as given the current prices
(pcom,q12,q13) and the future price q23. The key part of this
decision problem is the fact that the agent realizes that the
agent’s own preferences may change next period. Hence,
the agent cannot directly plan for period 2 and period 3
consumption. Instead, consumption in these periods is
essentially under the control of the agent’s future self, a
person in the same physical body but with different pref-
erences. Agent j must choose period 1 asset holdings tak-
ing into account this future self’s response to those asset
holdings next period (that is, taking as given the response
functions c* 2 and c* 3).
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Here, the objective includes how consumption (c2,c3)
responds to the agent’s choices of liquid and committed
wealth.
Equilibrium
Id e ﬁne an equilibrium in the natural way, as a speciﬁca-
















three criteria. First, (c j
2,c
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12, and W j
com = q23a
j







com) solves DP1 given q12, q13, q23, and pcom. And third,
markets clear, so that
c
j
1 dj = y1
c
j
2 dj = ¯ b2
c
j
3 dj = ¯ b
c
3
om + ¯ b3
b
j
12dj = ¯ b2
b
j
23 dj = b
j
13 dj = ¯ b3
a
j




This deﬁnition may seem overly elaborate, because it
allows for asymmetric equilibria. After all, this is a simple
economy in which agents are identical in tastes and en-
dowments. The equilibrium would seem to naturally have
identical allocations across agents. However, we will see
that any equilibrium is asymmetric if β′ 23 < β23.
If preferences are time-consistent, however, so that β′ 23
= β23, then we can price assets using the marginal rates of
substitution of a representative agent.
PROPOSITION1.Supposethat β′ 23=β23.Then autarkyisan









Proof. Let β′ 23 = β23. Then solving DP1 is equivalent to
solving
(c1,c2,c3) ∈ arg max(c1,c2,c3,acom)[u(c1)+β12u(c2)
+ β12β23u(c3)]
subject to
c1 + q12c2 +( c3−acom)q13 + pcomacom





c1, c2, c3, acom ≥ 0.
If pcom < q13, it is optimal to set c3 = acom.I fpcom > q13,i ti s
optimal to set acom = 0. Thus, DP1 is equivalent to
(c1,c2,c3) ∈ arg max(c1,c2,c3)[u(c1)+β12u(c2)
+ β12β23u(c3)]
subject to
c1 + q12c2 + min(pcom,q13)c3




c1, c2, c3 ≥ 0.
Thisproblemhasaconvexconstraintsetandastrictlycon-
cave objective. All agents have the same solution, which
means that in equilibrium they must consume autarky. The
rest of the proposition follows from the fact that all assets
are in positive supply. Q.E.D.
Here, the bonds are priced in the usual way, using the
marginal rates of substitution of the representative agent.
Note that when preferences are time-consistent, the com-
mitment asset is priced in the same way as the long-term
bond; there is no value to commitment.
Implications of the Model
Now I use the general equilibrium model just developed to
attempt to understand whether data on asset prices and
holdings can tell us if agents have time-inconsistent pref-
erences. Throughout, I assume that we know that the
above general equilibrium model is true, we know the
aggregate quantities (yt)
3
t=1, and we know the function u′.
I ask whether with this knowledge we can determine if β′ 23
= β23, based on asset prices and holdings. My answer is
both no and yes.
Bonds
First I argue that characteristics of bond prices cannot re-
veal whether preferences are time-inconsistent.
Note that in the model, agents have two ways to gen-
erate a unit of consumption in period 3 using the available
bonds. One is to buy a short-term bond in period 1 and roll
it over in period 2. The other is to simply buy a long-term
bond in period 1. The key result here is that in any equilib-
rium, the costs of these strategies are the same:
q12q23 = q13.
Theproofofthisisatypicalkindofarbitrageargument.
However, we must go through the argument carefully be-
cause of the time-consistency issue. Suppose that q12q23 >
q13. Because of market-clearing, some agent j has bond
holdings b
j
12 > 0. I claim that there is an element of the
constraint set of DP1 that improves this agent’s objective:
lower the agent’s short-term bond holdings b
j
12 by ε and





liq unchanged, but frees up resources in pe-




To improve this agent’s objective, lower the agent’s hold-
ings of long-term bonds b j
13 by ε and raise the short-term
bond holdings b
j
12by εq23. Again, this change in holdings
generates extra resources in period 1.
Hence, in this economy, the usual arbitrage arguments
apply to bond pricing. But this immediately means that the
economynever hasevidencein bondpricesagainstthehy-
pothesis that preferences are time-consistent.
Speciﬁcally, suppose that bond prices are given by (q12,
q13,q23). We see these prices and know u′and (yt)
3
t=1. Now











Then from Proposition 1, we know that if agents have
these discount factors, equilibrium bond prices are given
by (q12,q13,q23). Bond prices never contradict the hypothe-
sis of time-consistency. (Obviously, if we did not know u′
or (yt)
3
t=1, rejecting the hypothesis of time-consistency
would be harder.)
Why don’t bond prices reveal whether preferences are
time-consistent or time-inconsistent? In period 1, the rel-
ative price between period 2 and period 3 consumption is
given by q13/q12. Some might think that this relative price
contains information about β23, that is, the agents’ period
1 willingness to substitute between period 2 and period 3
consumption. But this thinking ignores dynamic arbitrage.
If agents anticipate that the period 2 relative price between
periods 2 and 3 consumption is q23, then the period 1 rel-
ativepricemustalsobeq23.Thismeansthatq23andq13/q12
have the same information about β23.
The result here can be generalized: in any economy, the
prices of one-period (short-term) assets and costlessly
retraded(long-term)assetsdonotcontradictthehypothesis
of time-consistency. The key is that even if preferences are
time-inconsistent, prices must not admit any dynamic ar-
bitrage opportunities. From the work of Hansen and Rich-
ard (1987), we know that this implies that there is a sto-
chastic pricing kernel representation for asset prices. This
pricingkernelcanimmediatelybetranslatedintoastochas-
tic discount factor for agents. (Indeed, these concepts are
identical if we allow agents to have linear utility.)
7
The Commitment Asset
Now I argue that we can learn whether preferences are
time-inconsistentfromsomecharacteristicsofcommitment
assets. I prove two results about this type of asset.
High Price
My ﬁrst result here is that if preferences are time-inconsis-
tent, then the commitment asset’s price is higher than the
present value of its future payoffs, which is to say, in equi-
librium, higher than the price of the long-term, retradable
bond.
Theproof works asfollows. Supposethat the long-term
bond and the commitment asset have the same return in
period 1. Then the agent in period 1 can translate period 1
consumption into period 3 consumption at the same rate
using either bonds or the commitment asset. Given the
time-consistency problem, it is then optimal for any agent
to commit to a particular level of c3by holding just enough
Wliq to fund the agent’s period 2 consumption, but no
more. This cannot be an equilibrium, though, because no
agent is holding any of the long-term bond at the end of
period 2.
PROPOSITION 2. If β′ 23 < β23, then in any equilibrium, pcom
> q13.
Proof. Suppose not, and let (c*,b* 12,b* 13,b* 23,a*), (q12,q13,
q23,pcom) be an equilibrium in which pcom ≤ q13. From
market-clearing, we know that for some j, b
j
2* 3 > 0. Then
β23u′(c
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3′, which implies in turn that a
j
c* om < c
j
3′.
















c′ om = c
j
3′
lies in the constraint set of DP1, given equilibrium prices


















































1* 2 + q13b
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The one inequality comes from the assumption that pcom ≤




































lies in the constraint set of DP1 and delivers a higher value











time-inconsistent. The agents want to commit to a certainamountofconsumptioninperiod3.Thecommitmentasset
is a better way to do so than the long-term bond; hence, in
equilibrium, the price of the commitment asset should be
higher than the price of the long-term bond.
Exclusive Holdings
My second result here is that asset holdings must be ex-










com > 0 for some agent j, then the long-term bond and
thecommitment assetare, onthe margin,equivalent. Their
rates of return must then be the same, which contradicts
Proposition 2.





com =0for all j.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary equilibrium (c*,b* 12,b* 13,b* 23,
a*), (q12,q13,q23,pcom). We know from Proposition 2 that
pcom > q13. Let b
j
2* 3 > 0 and a
j
c* om> 0 for some j. Then set
aj
c′ om = aj
c* om − ε, b
j
1′ 2 = b
j





− εq13, with ε sufficiently small that all the primed vari-
ables are positive. Clearly, this new plan satisﬁes the bud-
get constraint in DP1 and delivers more consumption in










for t> 1, so that this new plan also provides more utility to
the agent in period 1.



















1* 3 + b
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then that element solves DP2. But because b
j














3*) lies in the








c′ om) lies in
the constraint set of DP1 and improves the period 1 utility
of agent j. Q.E.D.
An immediate consequence of Proposition 3 is that









23 = ¯ b3. But this is im-
possible.
Propositions 2 and 3 suggest a natural question: Is there
any equilibrium at all if β′ 23 < β23? I do not know the
answer to this question for general speciﬁcations of u.I n
the Appendix, though, I construct an equilibrium for log
utility. In that equilibrium, the commitment asset pays a
low return relative to the long-term, retradable bond. Be-
tween periods 2 and 3, a fraction θ of the agents choose to
hold the commitment asset and a fraction 1 − θ of the
agents choose to hold the long-term bond. The ﬁrst strat-
egy pays a low return, but allows the agent in period 1 to
lock in a high level of saving from period 2 to period 3.
The second strategy does not deliver the lock-in effect, but
gives the agent a high return. The fraction θ adjusts until
the agents are indifferent between the two strategies.
My guess is that Propositions 2 and 3 are not as general
as Proposition 1. I can imagine a situation that would con-
tradict them. For example, suppose that agents face shocks
to their income that are not directly insurable. In this kind
of economy, agents smooth their consumption by selling
assets when their income is low. Because commitment as-
sets can’t be sold but retradable assets can, commitment




At the same time, Propositions 2 and 3 should be useful
benchmarksaslongastime-inconsistencyisactuallyquan-
titatively signiﬁcant. More speciﬁcally, I make the follow-
ing conjecture about economies in which agents have un-
insurable income shocks: If β23/β′ 23 is sufficiently large,
then commitment assets have a higher price than do re-
tradable assets, and agents’ portfolios consist nearly en-
tirely of commitment assets or nearly entirely of retradable
assets.
Evidence
So, to uncover evidence in favor of time-inconsistency, we
need to look at actual prices and holdings of commitment
assets. If preferences are time-inconsistent, the price of a
commitment asset is higher than that of comparable re-
tradable assets and agents do not simultaneously hold both
thecommitmentassetandretradableassets.Towhatextent
aretheseimplicationssupportedbyavailableempiricalevi-
dence? As best I can tell, not at all.
Overpriced Commitment Assets?
Commitment assets have two deﬁning features. First, they
are hard to sell. Second, they are hard to use as collateral:
borrowing against their future payoffs is costly for some
reason. Identifying actual commitment assets is not easy.
No thickly traded asset is a commitment asset, and even
thinly traded assets can generally be used as collateral for
loans. Still, I have come up with what I think are two good
examples of commitment assets.
One is education. Educated people pay a cost (primari-
ly, forgone wages) to acquire increased earning power.
Because of legal prohibitions against indentured servitude,
people cannot directly capitalize this increased earning
power. Moreover, for the same reason, borrowing against
it is often difficult.
Because education has both features of a commitment
asset, we know from Proposition 2 that education’s return
should be low. A considerable amount of effort has been
made to estimate the return to education. Card (1999,
Table 4) provides a partial survey of these estimates.
9 In
his survey, the (instrumental variable) estimates from the
United States range widely, from 6 percent to 15 percent.
In contrast, real stock returns in the United States over the
past century have averaged around 8 percent. I have not
found good measures of education’s risk as an asset.
Nonetheless, it is hard to conclude from this kind of analy-
sis that education returns are strikingly low.My other example of commitment assets is perhaps
more natural: IRAs. These are part of a U.S. government
program designed to encourage saving. People can invest
up to a ﬁxed amount per year in IRAs. Once people turn
age 59 1/2, they can withdraw funds from IRAs without
cost.However,theyfacepenaltiesforearlywithdrawaland
for borrowing against the contents of the accounts.
IRAs closely resemble commitment assets: they are de-
signed to allow agents to pre-commit to a lower ﬂoor for
consumption when they are retired. From Proposition 2,
then,if preferencesaretime-inconsistent, wewouldexpect
these assets to pay a low return. Of course, they don’t:
IRAs pay a return equivalent to that in the marketplace—
or higher, since IRAs are tax-free.
This would appear to be strong evidence against time-
inconsistency. We do have to be cautious, though. Unlike
the agents in the general equilibrium model, governments
are not wealth-maximizing entities. It is quite possible (in-
deed, more than likely) that some large portion of the
IRAs’ high return represents a government subsidy to
savers. To evaluate time-inconsistency, then, the appropri-
ate question to ask is, would the IRA program attract a
large amount of participation if people had to pay an
especially high (instead of especially low) tax on their re-
turns? There is, of course, no way to know for sure, but
with fairly high conﬁdence, I think the answer is no.
Exclusive Holdings?
Proposition 3 demonstrates that in equilibrium, if prefer-
ences are time-inconsistent, agents do not receive income
in period 3 from both retradable assets and commitment
assets. This characteristic of time-inconsistency is clearly
not supported by the evidence. Virtually all owners of in-
vestmentassets—includingthosewhoareeducatedorwho
own IRAs—also have a fairly large liquid or collateraliz-
able reserve, in the form of either bank accounts or equity
in their homes. There is thus little or no evidence con-
sistent with the exclusiveness implication of time-incon-
sistency.
But what if we changed the model economy so that
some agents have time-inconsistent preferences and others
have time-consistent preferences? Then if any agent
simultaneously holds commitment assets and retradable
assets, the same logic as in Proposition 3 implies that com-
mitment assets will not be overpriced. And the reasoning
in the proof of Proposition 2 then implies that the agents
with time-inconsistent preferences will buy only commit-
ment assets. It follows that if most people have time-
inconsistent preferences, most people should own only
commitment assets. We do not see this kind of asset hold-
ing behavior.
Conclusions
In this study, I have looked for evidence of time-inconsis-
tent preferences in asset market data. I have shown that be-
cause of dynamic arbitrage, there can be no evidence of
time-inconsistency in the prices of one-period assets or in
the prices of long-term, retradable assets. However, if peo-
plehavetime-inconsistentpreferences,commitmentassets
are systematically overpriced, and people do not hold both
them and retradable assets in equilibrium.
The question of whether or not preferences are actually
time-inconsistent may appear to be arcane and technical. It
is not. A major question—perhaps the major question—in
socioeconomic policy concerns the extent to which gov-
ernmentsshouldregulatemarketinteractionsandindividu-
alchoices.Undertraditionaleconomicmodelsofindividu-
al behavior, people act in their own interest. Any kind of
choice must improve their welfare; any kind of trade must
be mutually beneﬁcial. Under this assumption about hu-
man behavior, the main rationale for government interven-
tion is to cure externalities.
This changes if preferences are time-inconsistent. Now
the government has a new role to play: it can improve cur-
rentwelfarebylimitingfuturechoices.Janwouldwelcome
the government limiting her to four beers. Paul and other
consumers in the model economy would like the govern-
ment to stop sales of the retradable bond that pays off in
period 3. With time-inconsistent preferences, it is beneﬁ-
cial for the government to restrict individual choices in
order to guard people against the excesses of their future
selves.
Thus, the policy recommendations based on models
with time-inconsistent preferences may be quite radical.
Economists need to have strong evidence supporting time-
inconsistency before making such recommendations. The
data analysis here demonstrates that this kind of strong
evidence is not currently available.
*The author thanks V. V. Chari, Erzo Luttmer, Barbara McCutcheon, and Art Rol-
nick for their comments. He thanks Yan Bai for catching a subset (improper, the author
hopes) of his mistakes.
1The notion of time-inconsistent preferences over consumption proﬁles was ﬁrst
formalized by Strotz (1955–1956).
2For example, Laibson (1997) demonstrates that with time-inconsistent preferences,
it may be optimal for the government to restrict ﬁnancial market innovation. And
Jovanovic and Stolyarov (2000) show that societies in which agents have time-incon-
sistent preferences may ﬁnd it optimal to reject technological progress.
3My concept of a commitment asset differs from Laibson’s (1997) of an illiquid
asset. He models illiquidity by assuming that an agent must commit to selling the asset
one period before the sale takes place.
Another major difference between my analysis and Laibson’s is that he analyzes
a dynamic decision problem in which illiquid and liquid assets have the same rate of
return in every period. I consider a general equilibrium in which the price of the com-
mitment asset and the price of retradable bonds adjust so as to clear markets.
4My work here is quite different from that of Barro (1999) and Luttmer and
Mariotti (2000). These researchers do not allow for commitment assets, and they
restrict attention to stationary discounting (so that the utility discount factor between
two periods depends only on the amount of time between the two periods). These re-
searchers ask whether data on aggregate quantities and asset returns can be used to re-
ject the traditional assumption of time-consistent preferences. Despite the absence of
commitment assets, they ﬁnd that the answer to their question is generically yes.
The key to their result is their assumption of stationary discounting. If discounting
is stationary and preferences are time-consistent, then agents in any year have the same
utility discount factor between the years 2010 and 2011 as between the years 2001 and
2002. Time-consistency requires only that the utility discount factor between 2010 and
2011 be the same in 2001 as in 2010. Because it is more restrictive, the joint hypothe-
sis of stationary discounting and time-consistency is easier to refute than the single
hypothesis of time-consistency.
5Kocherlakota (1996) and Krusell and Smith (2000) show that the implications of
time-inconsistent preferences may be quite different when the horizon is inﬁnite.
6Formally, as Pollak (1968) does, I treat the outcome of the decision problem as
being the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a game between the agent in period
1 and the agent in period 2.
7Contrast this result with the logic of Barro (1999) and Luttmer and Mariotti
(2000). These researchers impose a stationarity restriction on discounting: the discount
factor between periods t and s is required to be a function of t − s. In my model, this











This restriction is falsiﬁable given data on {u′(yt)}
3
t=1, q12, and q23. Moreover, the
restriction is not generally valid if preferences are time-inconsistent. (See the Appen-
dix.) Hence, if discounting is restricted to satisfy stationarity, bond pricing data can be
used to reject time-consistency in favor of time-inconsistency.
8For a numerical analysis of a calibrated decision problem, see the work of Ange-
letos et al. (2001). They do not, however, solve for the full general equilibrium.
9Card (1999) literally reports estimates of the percentage increase in wages from
an additional year of schooling. We can interpret this as a return in the ﬁnancial sense
if most schooling costs are forgone wages and the increase in wages persists for a longtime. Under those assumptions, if the estimated coefficient is γ, then people give up a
wage w per unit of time and perpetually gain γw per unit of time. The internal rate of
return to this investment is γ.
Other than the usual selection issues (which the econometricians do their best to
control), there are various biases in this analysis that are easy to sign. If people work
while going to school, then the return to education is higher than γ. If the increase in
earnings does not last long, then the return to education is lower than γ. Finally, if
education involves signiﬁcant costs other than time, then the return is lower than γ.
Appendix
An Equilibrium When Utility Is Logarithmic
In this appendix, I construct an equilibrium for the case in
which u(c) = ln(c).
It is simple to show that in this case,






The function c* 2 is not concave; it is this nonconcavity that
generates the asymmetry in the equilibrium. I proceed by ﬁrst
guessing the equilibrium and then verifying my guess.
Guessing...














Given θ,d e ﬁne
q12 = β12y1¯ b
−
2
1[1 + θβ23 +( 1 −θ)β′ 23]/(1+β′ 23)




































































. . . And Verifying the Equilibrium
Now I will verify that this is actually an equilibrium.
To do that, ﬁrst I need to show that pcom > q13. Note that
ln(pcom) − ln(q13)
= ln(1−θ) − ln(θ) − ln(¯ b
c
3
om) + ln(¯ b3) + ln(1+β′ 23)





3[ln(1+β′ 23) − ln(1+β23)] + ln(1+β′ 23)
− ln(1+β23) + ln(β23) − ln(β′ 23).





3+1)/(1+β′ 23) − 1/β′ 23
=( β′ 23/β23−1)/[β′ 23 +( β′ 23)
2]
<0
if β′ 23 < β23. Hence, pcom > q13 if β′ 23 < β23. What this means is
that if j ≤θ , agents are following a low-return strategy in order
to commit themselves to a high level of period 3 consumption.
If j > θ, agents are following a high-return strategy that does not
generate as much period 3 consumption.
I can now show that these prices and quantities constitute an
equilibrium. It is straightforward but tedious to show that mar-
kets clear and that
c
j







for t = 2, 3 and for all j.









13) solves DP1 for all j. Because pcom > q13, I know from the
proof of Proposition 3 that there cannot be a solution to DP1 in
which a
j
com > 0 and b
j
23 > 0. This means that any solution to
DP1 must lie in the portion of the constraint set in which a
j
com
= 0 or in the portion of the constraint set in which Wcom ≥
β′ 23Wliq.
I ﬁrst show that the candidate equilibrium allocation for j ≤
θ solves a version of DP1 in which a
j









c1 + q12b12 + q13b13 = y1 + pcom¯ b
c
3
om + q12¯ b2 + q13¯ b3






c1, b12, b13 ≥ 0.
I can substitute out (b12,b13) so that this problem has a strictly







c1 + q12(c2+q23c3)=y1 + pcom¯ b
c
3






c1, c2, c3 ≥ 0.
The ﬁrst-order conditions are necessary and sufficient, and the
candidate equilibrium allocation for j ≤θsatisﬁes these ﬁrst-
order conditions.
I next show that the candidate equilibrium allocation for j >









c1 + q12b12 + q13b13 + pcomacom = y1 + pcom¯ b
c
3
om + q12¯ b2
+ q13¯ b3
c2 = b12 + q23b13
c3 = acom
q23acom ≥ (b12+q23b13)β′ 23
c1, b12, b13, acom ≥ 0.






c1 + q12c2 + pcomc3 = y1 + pcom¯ b
c
3
om + q12¯ b2 + q13¯ b3
q23c3 = β′ 23c2
c1, c2, c3 ≥ 0.
This problem has a strictly concave objective and a convex con-
straint set. The consumption allocation for j > θ is the unique
solution, because it satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order necessary conditions.
I now claim that the candidate equilibrium allocations for
all θ solve DP1. But this claim follows trivially from the fact
that both consumption allocations generate the same period 1
utility. Thus, I have veriﬁed that the candidate equilibrium al-
locations satisfy period 1 optimality, period 2 optimality, and
market-clearing. Q.E.D.
Note that the equilibrium allocations actually provide less
period 1 utility to the agents than do their original endowment
streams. This may seem strange, but given the equilibrium
prices, an agent cannot credibly commit to not trading. In par-
ticular, an agent who does not trade in period 1 will want to sell
some of the long-term bond in period 2.
Note also that if ¯ b
c
3
om = 0, there is no trade in equilibrium.
Hence, it would be Pareto-improving if all of the agents’ period
3 endowments came in the form of a long-term, retradable as-
set.
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